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The macroeconomic eﬀects of aid ﬂows have been the sub-
ject of an extensive and ongoing debate in both policy and aca-
demic circles. Many have argued that, despite the external
ﬁnancing constraints these ﬂows help alleviate—and the public
infrastructure they can help pay for—aid surges can hurt
growth by inducing real exchange rate appreciation pressures,
to the detriment of growth-promoting exporting industries. 1
In practice, these concerns have triggered policy responses
that have inﬂuenced the actual eﬀects of aid. In a canonical
aid transaction, the foreign exchange (FX) accrues to the gov-
ernment, which sells it to the central bank in exchange for a lo-
cal currency deposit, which is then drawn down as the
government spends the aid. With a managed ﬂoat, the central
bank in turn decides whether to use the FX to accumulate for-
eign reserves, and if so whether such accumulation should be
sterilized. Berg et al. (2007) document how, during aid surge
episodes in several African countries withmanaged ﬂoats (Gha-
na, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda), concerns about real
appreciation resulted in large accumulations of reserves. This
policy response may have helped contain the appreciation pres-
sures. But it also resulted in a peculiar situation in which the aid
was used twice: once to increase government spending, and
once to increase the stock of reserves. The private sector was
crowded out as a result, mainly through higher interest rates
(when the accumulation was sterilized) and in some cases also
through the inﬂation tax (when otherwise).
The crucial role of the central bank in the macroeconomics
of aid has received little attention in the academic literature
until recently. 2 Indeed, most previous work on the topic is
built on the standard treatment of the transfer problem, which
assumes that, to the extent the aid is being fully spent, it must
also result in higher domestic absorption (an increase in the
current account deﬁcit net of aid), and by extension that aid
cannot be both spent and saved as international reserves at
the same time. 3 While this assumption would be viable if
the public sector—the direct recipient of the aid—was a single
entity, it no longer holds once it is acknowledged that the pub-
lic sector consists of two separate institutions: the government
and the central bank. This duality makes the distinction be-
tween spending and absorbing the aid crucial. While the for-
mer is determined by ﬁscal policy, the latter is inﬂuenced by116the reserve policy of the central bank, especially when capital
mobility is limited. In practice there is no institutional arrange-
ment that ensures coordination between the two policies, thus
allowing for the spending without absorbing policy mix de-
scribed above. 4
In previous works, Berg, Mirzoev, Portillo, and Zanna
(2010) and Berg, Gottschalk, Portillo, and Zanna (2010) have
used this typology to model the eﬀects of aid surges—episodes
of large and persistent yet temporary increases in aid—under
managed ﬂoats, in both the short and medium term. Berg,
Mirzoev, et al. (2010) developed a tractable new-Keynesian
model with traded and non-traded goods to study short-run
eﬀects. Unlike the predictions of the standard transfer problem
analysis, these authors showed that a policy of spending but
not absorbing the aid can result in both a real and nominal
depreciation if the resulting demand pressures, due to the ﬁscal
expansion, are strong enough to threaten external balance.
This can be the case even if the accumulation of reserves is
fully sterilized (their default assumption in managed ﬂoats).
Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010) extended the model to allow
for endogenous capital accumulation, production externalities
in the export sector, and possible ineﬃciencies in the conver-
sion of public investment into public capital. When aid is both
spent and absorbed, the model predicted a sizeable nominal
and real appreciation, sectoral reallocations between the
traded and the non-traded sector, and a crowding-in of private
investment due to the positive eﬀects of higher infrastructure
on the returns to private capital. Instead, when aid is spent
but not absorbed, the policy mix can have negative medium-
term eﬀects on growth and on welfare because of the crowding
out of private investment. 5
In this paper, we both extend and simplify the model in
Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010) to study the role of the
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banks have at their disposal, in shaping the eﬀects of aid
surges. We answer a number of questions. First, are the mac-
roeconomic eﬀects of aid diﬀerent in ﬁxed versus ﬂexible (man-
aged ﬂoats) regimes? Second, what impact do sterilization
policies (in pegs) have on aid absorption? Third, what are
the welfare implications of alternative policy responses, under
either ﬂexible or ﬁxed exchange rates?
Understanding the role of the exchange rate regime in the
macroeconomics of aid is, in our opinion, of ﬁrst-order impor-
tance. First, sub-Saharan Africa is evenly divided between
pegs and managed ﬂoats: 23 of the 44 countries covered by
the African department of the IMF have a de jure ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime, while the rest have some type of managed
ﬂoat (see Berg & Portillo, 2008, chap. II). Second, the impor-
tance of aid for both ﬁscal and balance of payment support
cuts across exchange rate regimes, and concerns with the ef-
fects of aid are as pervasive in countries with managed ﬂoats,
e.g., as discussed in Berg et al. (2007), as in hard pegs, e.g., the
CFA zone, as documented by Ouattara and Strobl (2008). To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that provides a systematic
treatment of the exchange rate regime in the macroeconomics
of aid from a spending/absorption perspective.
In principle, the ability to inﬂuence aid absorption in pegs is
limited because the central bank does not have control over its
reserve accumulation. In practice, limited capital mobility (a
pervasive feature of low-income countries) provides an addi-
tional degree of freedom, which is embodied in the central
bank’s ability to sterilize (or not) any reserve accumulation
that follows from the defense of the peg. Assuming that the
government spends the aid as it accrues, we study two stylized
responses by the central bank: sterilizing or not sterilizing the
endogenous accumulation of reserves. For ﬂexible (managed)
regimes, on the other hand, we assume the central bank can
accumulate aid as reserves and study the macroeconomic con-
sequences of doing so.
Our ﬁndings are the following, based on a calibration of the
model that captures a representative sub-Saharan African
country:
First, a policy of limited or no sterilization allows for almost
(but slightly less than) full absorption of the aid surge and size-
able real appreciation. This is the aid analog of the specie-ﬂow
mechanism that dates back to Hume. The initial increase in
liquidity that results from spending the aid domestically fuels
aggregate demand, inﬂation, and imports, which are then ﬁ-
nanced with the aid-related FX. The end result is similar to
the case of no reserve accumulation in a managed ﬂoat. Just
like in the managed ﬂoat, the economy experiences a real
appreciation and an increase in private consumption, invest-
ment, and output. Unlike the managed ﬂoat, the real appreci-
ation is achieved via an increase in inﬂation, which can only
come about through higher aggregate demand pressures in
the short run. The increase in inﬂation also requires some
accumulation of reserves to help accommodate the increase
in demand for nominal money balances, which explains why
absorption is less than complete.
Second, a policy of complete sterilization in a peg can greatly
limit inﬂation and the real appreciation but at the cost of lim-
iting absorption and crowding out the private sector, similar to
a policy of deliberately accumulating aid in reserves in a ﬂoat.
Out of concern for the increase in inﬂation, either because it
signals aggregate demand pressures or because it amounts to
a real appreciation and therefore a potential loss of competi-
tiveness, the central bank may decide to engage in open-market
operations that limit the initial increase in liquidity. By doing
so, the central bank is raising real interest rates and forcingthe private sector to reduce its spending, which then limits
the demand for imports and helps support the accumulation
of reserves. The end result is less inﬂation and a less appreciated
real exchange rate, but at the cost of crowding out private
investment and aﬀecting output in the medium term.
Third, like in the managed ﬂoat case, the ability to inﬂuence
absorption and the real exchange rate is reduced in a ﬁxed re-
gime as international capital mobility increases. This is a well-
known result, which is often restated more generally as the
inability of the central bank to control short-run inﬂation in
a peg when the capital account is perfectly open. One surprising
result from our model is that, even without restrictive monetary
policy, the positive eﬀects of aid on private consumption, pri-
vate investment, and real output can disappear once interna-
tional capital mobility increases signiﬁcantly. The reason is
that the open capital account activates the uncovered interest
parity condition, generating a strong link between domestic
real interest rates and expected real depreciation. As the real
exchange rate overshoots in the short-run relative to its future
value—because the aid surge is temporary—the expected fu-
ture depreciation acts as a drag on private consumption and
investment and increases capital outﬂows. While we do not
wish to overemphasize this result, since it is sensitive to the spe-
ciﬁc calibration we use, it indicates the real possibility of capital
ﬂight in response to the aid surge. 6
In sum, much of the drama that is present in response to aid
surges in managed ﬂoats is equally present under ﬁxed ex-
change rate regimes, with the additional complication that
higher inﬂation is necessary for the aid to be absorbed. Be-
cause there are potential trade-oﬀs between inﬂation (under
no sterilization) and private sector crowding out (under full
sterilization) in a peg, we therefore undertake a welfare analy-
sis as a selection criterion for sterilization policies under a ﬁxed
and for reserve accumulation policies in managed ﬂoats.
The welfare analysis yields a number of interesting ﬁndings.
First, in our model, policies that encourage aid absorption are
welfare dominant, regardless of the exchange rate regime: it is
preferable to allow the country as a whole to use the aid-re-
lated FX, rather than having it sit in an account in New York.
For this reason, in the case of a peg, a policy of no sterilization
largely dominates a policy of complete sterilization, while in
the case of a managed ﬂoat, a policy of no reserve accumula-
tion dominates a policy of full reserve accumulation. Second,
policies that result in aid absorption have similar welfare ef-
fects under pegs and ﬂexible exchange rates, although ﬂexible
exchange rates regime are slightly superior. This is because
ﬂexible exchange rate regimes can absorb aid with a much
smaller aggregate demand boom than pegs, which instead
need the boom—the increase in inﬂation—for aid absorption.
At the other end of the spectrum, policies that result in limited
aid absorption have larger negative eﬀects on welfare in pegs
than in managed ﬂoats, mainly because they have larger eﬀects
on private investment. Third, for pegs, only when the degree of
sterilization reaches a high enough share of the reserve accu-
mulation does this policy limit the degree of aid absorption
and, therefore, results in a signiﬁcant reduction in welfare.
This suggests that what matters for aid absorption under a
peg is that there is some monetary policy expansion—in order
to encourage the private sector to increase its demand for im-
ports.
Previous works in the aid literature have explored some of
the policy issues we discuss in this paper. Adam, O’Connell,
Buﬃe, and Pattillo (2009), Buﬃe, Adam, O’Connell, and Pat-
tillo (2004, 2008), and Buﬃe, O’Connell, and Adam (2010)
have extensively analyzed the role of monetary policy and ex-
change rate regimes in the context of aid surges. However,
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cal dominance, which conﬂate the direct impact of aid with
passive changes in monetary policy and currency-demand in-
duced capital ﬂows. Unlike our paper, these authors do ﬁnd
beneﬁts to reserve accumulation following an aid surge. The
main diﬀerence between our paper and theirs is twofold. First,
we treat the central bank as an independent institution, which
raises policy coordination issues with the government. In their
setup the central bank does not have complete control over
inﬂation, because of existing ﬁscal dominance, which then
interacts with changes in the demand for currency (domestic
and foreign) in ways that amplify the short-run eﬀects of the
surge and, therefore, justiﬁes accumulating reserves in order
to undo some of the capital inﬂow. While monetary ﬁnancing
of the deﬁcit is sometimes an important issue in monetary pol-
icy in low-income countries, it is not necessary for the macro-
economics of aid ﬂows. Second, we allow for private and
public capital accumulation, which raises the (real) output
costs of reserve accumulation and sterilization policies.
Another strand of the literature, including Adam and Bevan
(2006), Age´nor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2008), Age´nor
and Yilmaz (2013), Arellano, Bulir, Lane, and Lipschitz
(2009), Cerra, Tekin, and Turnovsky (2008), and Chatterjee
and Turnovsky (2007), among others, explores the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of aid in the context of real growth models. But
these works abstract from central bank policy and therefore
are not suitable to discuss ﬁscal/reserve policy interactions
and their real eﬀects, as our modeling approach allows. Fur-
thermore, our work is also related to an older literature on
“counterpart funds”, the local currency proceeds from the sale
within the aid-recipient country of in-kind transfers such as
food aid (see Khatkhate, 1963, and Roemer, 1988, in this jour-
nal, among others). While these papers had identiﬁed some of
the mechanisms we discuss here, they lack a coherent modeling
framework to make sense of the policy responses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the structure of the model. Section 3
discusses the calibration of the model. Section 4 presents
and elaborates on the results of the policy experiments under
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime and a managed ﬂoat. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.2. THE MODEL
Our framework is a simpliﬁed version of the model
presented in Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010). It consists of a
standard two-sector new-Keynesian model of a small open
economy enriched with policy reaction functions that deter-
mine the degree of exchange rate commitment, international
reserve accumulation, and sterilization. 7 The country
produces a non-traded good yNt and a traded good y
T
t using
private capital k, labor l, and government-supplied infrastruc-
ture q. Households may hold both domestic and foreign assets,
but the latter are subject to portfolio adjustment costs. These
costs capture the degree of international capital mobility, and
their calibration allows to study a range of options, from de
facto closed to a fully open capital account.
We separate policy decisions: the central bank is in charge of
exchange rate and monetary policy (including international
reserves accumulation and open-market operations), while
the ﬁscal authority, which is the direct recipient of aid, decides
how much of this aid to spend. All quantity variables except
labor are de-trended by the labor productivity level, which
grows at a constant factor n—the exogenous long-run gross
growth rate of the economy.We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded
good. Therefore PTt ¼ StPTt , where PTt is the price of traded
goods, St corresponds to the nominal exchange rate, and PTt
is the foreign price of traded goods. By denoting the domestic
(foreign) Consumer Price Index (CPI) as P t (P t ), we can ex-
press the CPI-based real exchange rate as st ¼ StP

t
P t
and the rel-
ative price of non-traded goods as pNt ¼ P
N
t
Pt . We also deﬁne real
gross domestic product (GDP) as: yt ¼ pNyNt þ syTt , i.e., the
sum of the production of the non-traded good, yNt , and the
traded good, yTt , valued at their steady-state relative prices
pN and s.
We proceed to lay out the model in stages, starting with the
production side.
(a) Firms in the traded (T) and non-traded (N) good sectors
In each sector j ¼ T ;N , the representative ﬁrm i produces
goods with a technology that combines labor (ljit), ﬁrm-speciﬁc
private capital (kjit1), and public capital (qt1), according to
yjit ¼ zj kjit1
 /
qt1ð Þ1/
h i1a
ljit
 a
; ð1Þ
where zj is a constant productivity parameter, a indicates the
production share of labor, and / denotes the share of private
capital in total capital used in production. Private capital is
accumulated via investment xjit but is subject to depreciation
and adjustment costs, as described by
nkjit ¼ ð1 dÞkjit1 þ 1 F jit
 
xjit; ð2Þ
where d is the depreciation rate and F jit  j2
xjit
xj
it1
 1
 2
are
adjustment costs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005).
Firms in the traded sector face perfect competition and
ﬂexible prices, while ﬁrms in the non-traded sector face
monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Each monopolist
in the non-traded sector (j ¼ N ) produces a variety i of the
non-traded good and is subject to a demand constraint of
the Dixit-Stiglitz type with h measuring the elasticity of
substitution of these varieties. Moreover, as in Rotemberg
(1982), the monopolist faces price adjustment costs capturing
price stickiness, where the parameter n quantiﬁes the degree
of this stickiness.
Firms in both sectors are proﬁt-maximizers. They choose
the amount of labor, private capital, and investment (and
the price pNit in the case of ﬁrms in the non-traded sector) that
maximize the discounted proﬁts. In each sector, there is also a
tax distortion - that reduces the value of ﬁrms’ sales,
capturing a broad set of institutional features that keep poor
countries from investing at the high rates that might otherwise
be justiﬁed by the very low stocks of private capital. In
this way, we match the observed low investment shares in
low-income countries.(b) Households
Consumers must decide how to allocate consumption expen-
ditures among diﬀerent goods. Consumption, denoted by cTt
and cNt , respectively, are combined into a CES basket
ct ¼ u1v cNt
 v1
v þ ð1 uÞ1v cTt
 v1
v
h i v
v1
, where v denotes the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution, and u is the degree
of home bias in consumption. 8
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X1
t¼0
btU t; ð3Þ
where
Ut ¼ gg 1 log #ðctÞ
g1
g þ ð1 #Þ mtð Þ
g1
g
h i
 ,
1þ w ðltÞ
1þw
 
;
ð4Þ
mt are the holdings of real money balances, and lt is the
amount of labor supplied to ﬁrms. The parameter b 2 ð0; 1Þ
corresponds to the subjective discount factor, # 2 ð0; 1Þ is
the share of consumption in utility g > 0 measures the elastic-
ity of substitution between ct and mt; , is a scale parameter,
and w > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Labor mobility is limited across sectors and intersectoral
wage diﬀerentials are possible. Supplied labor is then deﬁned
as in Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009) by a CES
aggregator with d measuring the share of labor supplied to
the non-traded sector, lNt , in total employment, and . corre-
sponding to the elasticity of substitution between labor ser-
vices provided to the two sectors.
The budget constraint of the representative agent, deﬂated
by the domestic CPI and normalized by the economy’s growth
rate, is given by:
ct þ mt þ bct þ stbt þ stPt ¼ ð1 sÞwtlt þ
mt1
npt
þ it1 b
c
t1
npt
þ stit1
bt1
np
þ Xt; ð5Þ
where bct is the consumer’s real holdings of domestic bonds is-
sued by the government, which pay a gross nominal interest
rate it, and b

t denotes his real holdings of foreign assets that
pay it and are subject to portfolio adjustment costs Pt. More-
over, wtlt is total labor income, pt ¼ PtP t1 denotes gross domes-
tic inﬂation, while p is foreign inﬂation, which is assumed to
be constant. Xt denotes real proﬁts from domestic ﬁrms and s
is an income tax rate set by the government.
The portfolio adjustment costs are given by Pt  t2
ðbt  bÞ2, where b is the steady-state value of real foreign
assets. These costs serve two purposes. First, they ensure
stationarity of bt .
9 Second, they allow us to model limited
international capital mobility. When t! þ1, the capital
account is practically closed; whereas when 0 < t1, it is
partially open.
The problem of the representative consumer reduces to max-
imizing (3) with respect to consumption, real money balances,
labor supply in both sectors, and domestic and foreign assets,
subject to the constraint (5) and a transversality condition
associated with all asset holdings.
(c) The government
(i) Fiscal policy
The government is the direct recipient of foreign aid At ,
which follows the process
At ¼ A þ qAðAt1  AÞ þ At ; ð6Þ
where A is the steady-state level of aid, At corresponds to an
exogenous increase in aid at time t, and qA 2 ð0; 1Þ is the
degree of persistence of the increase in aid.
Government consumption gt is a CES basket similar to that
of the households, but with m and v reﬂecting the weight onnon-traded goods and the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods, respectively, and with an asso-
ciated relative price index pgt .
The government is subject to a period-by-period budget
constraint (in real terms) of the type
pgt gt ¼ swtlt þ stAt þ bt 
bt1
npt
 
 ðit1  1Þb
c
t1
npt
: ð7Þ
The government can ﬁnance its spending pgt gt by taxing labor
income swtlt, using the domestic currency value of aid
proceeds, or issuing domestic debt net of amortization. It must
however pay interest on the share of government debt held by
the private sector ðbct Þ. The stock of total government debt (bt)
is constant and is held by either the private sector or by the
central bank ðbcbt Þ, with their relative shares varying through
open-market operations by the central bank. 10 So
bt ¼ b ¼ bct þ bcbt .
The previous budget constraint implies that spending will al-
ways adjust to satisfy the constraint (7). In addition, spending
can be used for public consumption or investment purposes.
For simplicity, public investment is a constant share of
government spending, i.e., xgt ¼ lgt with l 2 ½0; 1. It serves
to accumulate public capital qt following
nqt ¼ ð1 dgÞqt1 þ xgt ; ð8Þ
where dg is the depreciation rate of public capital.
(d) The central bank
We are interested in the implications of diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes for themacroeconomic eﬀects of aid surges.Wewill
ﬁrst consider the case of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime and use
it as a benchmark to understand the eﬀects of having a ﬁxed re-
gime. Then, under a ﬁxed regime, we will analyze the macroeco-
nomic consequences of diﬀerent sterilization policies, and we
will compare them with the outcomes of managed ﬂoats.
To organize the discussion, it is helpful to start with the cen-
tral bank balance sheet in ﬁrst (real) diﬀerences:
mt  mt1
npt
¼ bcbt 
bcbt
npt
þ st Rt 
Rt1
np
 
: ð9Þ
That is, real changes in money supply, mt  mt1npt , depend on
open-market operations, bcbt  b
cb
t
npt
, and changes in international
reserves, st Rt 
Rt1
np
 	
. We proceed to describe how the com-
ponents of this equation are determined. Note that, although
the central bank accumulates reserves, the public sector does
not derive any revenue from accumulating these assets. In par-
ticular, reserves do not enter the government’s budget con-
straint directly. This reﬂects our assumption that reserves do
not earn any interest.
(i) Exchange rate regimes and reserve accumulation policies
We capture diﬀerent speciﬁcations of exchange regimes
(managed ﬂoat versus ﬁxed) by assuming that the central bank
implements the following rule for the accumulation of interna-
tional reserves:
Rt  R ¼ qR Rt1  R
 þ ð1 xÞ At  A  xsðpSt
 pSÞ; ð10Þ
where pSt is the nominal depreciation of the currency, and R

and pS are the steady-state levels (targets) of reserves and nom-
inal depreciation. The parameter xs P 0 measures the degree
of commitment to a nominal depreciation target. For xs ¼ 0,
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xs  0, the rule captures a ﬁxed regime. Under a ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime, the central bank can still accumulate re-
serves in response to changes in the volume of aid. In this
case the regime becomes a managed ﬂoat. The coeﬃcient
x 2 ½0; 1 measures the fraction of additional aid dollars sold
on the market to the private sector by the central bank, i.e.,
the degree of absorption of aid by the private sector. Under
a ﬁxed regime, on the other hand, reserves accumulation is dri-
ven by the central bank’s commitment to hitting the targeted
nominal depreciation pS . 11 This, of course, implies that aid
absorption by the private sector, under a ﬁxed regime, be-
comes endogenously determined, as we discuss below.
(ii) Monetary and sterilization policies
We allow for two alternative money growth rules: either full
or zero sterilization. To model full sterilization, we assume
that open-market operations (changes in bcbt ) adjust such that
nominal reserve money always grows at the rate g—i.e.,
Mt
Mt1
¼ g—implying that
mt ¼ gmt1
npt
: ð11Þ
This captures the fact that many low-income countries still tar-
get money, at least de jure. More speciﬁcally, full sterilization
requires that open-market operations follow:
bcbt 
bcbt1
npt
¼ mt1
npt
g 1ð Þ  st Rt 
Rt1
np
 
: ð12Þ
Then if aid is accumulated in international reserves, either in
the case of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime or under a ﬁxed re-
gime, open-market operations would increase—the stock of
government debt held by the central bank would decrease—
in order to fully sterilize the direct monetary injection that
would follow from higher aid inﬂows.
In the alternative speciﬁcation, central bank purchases of
nominal government bonds grow at constant rate g:
bcbt 
bcbt1
npt
¼ b
cb
t1
npt
g 1ð Þ: ð13Þ
At steady state, this process ensures that nominal money sup-
ply grows at the gross rate g, which pins down the steady-state
level of inﬂation, just like in the previous speciﬁcation. OutsideTable 1. Calibration: technology
Parameters Values Source/method
a 0.7 The sectoral labor’s shares are based on Uganda’s in
/ 0.47 The public capital parameter in production function
j 25 The private investment adjustment cost parameters
n 1.0171 The trend growth rate matches Uganda’s annual gro
zN=zT 1.06 The ratio of the productivity parameters in the prod
d 0.015 The private capital depreciation rates (Bu, 2004)
n 47 The price adjustment cost parameter implies prices a
u 0.51 The distribution parameter for consumption of non-
v 0.89 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
h 12 The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between
, 0.872 The disutility of labor parameter normalizes househ
w 2.5 The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (standard value i
# 0.999 The share of consumption in utility function helps m
g 0.180 The real money balances to nominal interest rate se
d 0.6 The distribution labor parameter matches the Ugan
R 1 The labor services elasticity of substitution (Horvath
b 0.995 The discount factor helps match interest rates in Ug
t 1000 The portfolio adjustment costs parameter
b 0 The private external debt in the long run is normaliof the steady state, however, this rule does not ensure a con-
stant growth rate for nominal money. In this case, the money
growth rate will increase when aid is accumulated as interna-
tional reserves.
(e) The balance of payments
We conclude our presentation of the model with the balance
of payments:
At ¼ cTt þgTt þxaTt þP t yTt 
ðit11Þbt1
np|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
CAD
þbt 
bt1
np|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
KAS
þRt 
Rt1
np|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
RA
;
ð14Þ
where xaTt corresponds to the traded components of the invest-
ments in the traded and non-traded sectors, respectively. Eqn.
(14) makes clear the possible uses of aid: it can ﬁnance a higher
current account deﬁcit net of aid (CAD), a capital account sur-
plus (KAS), or an accumulation of reserves (RA).3. CALIBRATION
Our analysis will rely on numerical simulations. 12 To im-
pose discipline, we calibrate most of the parameters of the
model to a representative low-income country. As in Berg,
Gottschalk, et al. (2010), we replicate the Ugandan economy
for the period 2008–09, and assume that the unit of time in
the model is a quarter. Uganda captures important features
of sub-Saharan African economies: low investment in infra-
structure, sizeable dependence on aid with large and persistent
shocks to aid ﬂows, low tax revenue as a percent of GDP,
among other features. And although Uganda follows a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, we use it as a baseline for at least two
reasons. First, the ﬂexible regime case provides a benchmark
to understand the implications of ﬁxing the exchange rate,
as our comparative analysis will show below. Second, this
baseline of a ﬂexible regime, together with no reserve accumu-
lation, is an optimal benchmark as it maximizes welfare in our
analysis—i.e., it shows the highest positive impact of aid on
consumption relative to which other policy scenarios can be
considered.and preference parameters
put–output tables
s ensures an annual return on public capital of 20%
ensure smooth impulse responses for investment
wth rate (7%)
uctive sectors ensures the real exchange rate equals one at steady state
re sticky for almost one year (standard value in the literature)
traded goods is consistent with Uganda National Income Accounts
non-traded and traded goods in Uganda (Tokarick, 2009)
varieties matches a markup of 10% (standard value in the literature)
olds employment to one at steady state
n the literature)
atch Uganda’s real money balances in percent of GDP (6%)
mi-elasticity is based on a regression using Uganda’s data
dan share of non-traded production in value added (60%)
, 2000)
anda
zed to zero
Table 2. Calibration: policy parameters and aid process
Parameters Value Source/method
Aid process
qA 0.9 The persistence parameter of the aid process implies a half-life of the shock of about 1 year
A 0.049 The aid to GDP share matches Uganda data (5%)
A 0.226 The aid shock matches a scaling up on average of 6 percentage points of GDP in 5 years
The Government
m 0.7 The distribution parameter of non-traded goods consumed by the government ensures market clearing for non-traded goods
s 0.188 The tax rate on labor helps match the share of government spending (18% of GDP)
l 0.389 The share of public investment in total government spending matches the public investment to GDP ratio (7%)
bh 0.085 The stock of government debt held by consumers matches Uganda’s domestic government debt to GDP share (4.2%)
bcb 0.094 The stock of government debt held by central bank matches its share to GDP (5%)
dg 0.015 The public capital depreciation rate (Bu, 2004)
- 0.09 The tax distortion helps match Uganda’s private investment share (16% of GDP)
The Central Bank
R 0.365 The international reserves target helps match Uganda’s stock of reserves (18% of GDP)
x 1 The policy parameter that determines absorption in the international reserves accumulation rule
qR 0.95 Persistence in reserve accumulation
xs 0 or 5000 The policy parameter that determines the type of exchange rate regime: ﬂexible (0) or ﬁxed (5000)
g 1.032 The reserve money (gross) growth rate at the steady state is consistent with Uganda’s annual inﬂation (6%)
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of parameters that help pin down (i) technologies and prefer-
ences and (ii) policies (see Tables 1 and 2). We now brieﬂy dis-
cuss the calibration of some of these parameters, particularly
those for which we do not use Ugandan speciﬁc data or we
do not normalize.
For the technology parameter /, which determines the im-
pact of public capital on growth, we pick values such that
the annual return to public investment is about 20%. Estimates
of this return vary signiﬁcantly across empirical studies. How-
ever, the weight of the evidence in both micro and macro stud-
ies points to a high average return. Foster and Bricen˜o-
Garmendia (2010) estimate returns for electricity, water and
sanitation, irrigation, and roads range from 17% to 24%. Sim-
ilarly, the macro-based estimates in Dalgaard and Hansen
(2005) cluster between 15% and 30% for a wide array of diﬀer-
ent estimators. The investment adjustment cost parameter (j)
ensures smooth impulse responses for investment, whereas the
depreciation rates (d) are in line with Bu (2004) calculations.
The price adjustment cost parameter (n) implies price sticki-
ness for almost a year, while the elasticity of substitution be-
tween non-traded varieties (h) matches a standard value for
markups in the literature of 10%.
With respect to the elasticity of substitution between hours
worked in the two sectors ., we set it to 1, which corresponds
to the econometric estimates provided by Horvath (2000).
Assuming very large values for .—perfect labor substitu-
tion—does not aﬀect the qualitative results. Similarly, follow-
ing the macro-labor literature we set the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity equal to 2:5. We assume that the economy has a
closed capital account, which makes sterilization policies quite
eﬀective. While somewhat extreme, this assumption is sup-
ported by measures of de jure restrictions on cross-border
ﬁnancial transactions in Schindler (2009): on an index that
ranges between zero and one, where zero corresponds to per-
fectly open capital and one corresponds to perfectly closed, the
value for the median sub-Saharan African country is 0.76. For
comparison, the value for the median OECD country is 0.04.
Consequently, we choose a very high value for the portfolio
adjustment costs parameter ðt ¼ 1000Þ.
We model a temporary but persistent increase in aid such
that, as a result of the scaling up, aid is on average six percent-
age points of GDP higher than its steady-state value over thefollowing 5 years. Note that the coeﬃcient qA in the process
for aid described in (6) results in a half life of the shock of
slightly more than a year, which implies the aid increase is
front loaded. This stylized path helps us bring out the macro-
economic dynamic responses in a clearer way.
The values of the parameters of the central bank represent
the policy experiments that we will study below. We will com-
pare the implications of ﬂexible versus ﬁxed exchange rate re-
gimes. To do so, we set xs ¼ 0 and xs ¼ 5000 in the rule (10),
respectively. When studying ﬂexible exchange rates, we will al-
low the central bank to accumulate aid in international re-
serves. When x ¼ 1 in (10), the central bank does not
accumulate aid in reserves—i.e., full aid absorption. While if
x ¼ 0 then the central bank accumulates all aid in re-
serves—i.e., no aid absorption—with a signiﬁcant persistence
in the accumulation process (qR ¼ 0:95). In the case of pegs,
we will focus on either full or no sterilization (as described
by (12) or (13), respectively). Below we will also show how
we can also write a more general rule that nests these two op-
tions as extremes in a continuum.4. SIMULATION RESULTS
(a) A ﬂexible exchange rate regime versus a ﬁxed regime: are
they similar?
To ﬁx ideas, we start by comparing the case of a ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime (xs ¼ 0) and no accumulation of aid in
international reserves (x ¼ 1) with the case of a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime (xs ¼ 5000) and no sterilization. The results of the
simulations are presented in Figure 1, where the annualized
impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables are
measured as percentage deviations from steady state, unless
otherwise noted.
Focusing on the ﬂexible regime case ﬁrst (see solid line in Fig-
ure 1), we see that government spending of aid drives the short-
run macroeconomic eﬀects of the aid surge. Overall
government spending increases by a similar magnitude than
the increase in aid. Nominal price rigidities imply that the sup-
ply of non-traded goods greatly expands in response to greater
demand generating a short-lived spike in real GDP. This expan-
sion in non-traded output is partly accomplished through high-
Figure 1. The macroeconomic eﬀects of aid surges under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime and a ﬁxed regime without sterilization. Impulse responses are shown
in annual terms and as percentage deviations from steady state, unless otherwise noted.
122 WORLD DEVELOPMENTer labor demand, which contributes to the rapid increase in real
wages in the short run (not shown) and translates into higher
non-traded goods inﬂation. This, however, does not induce
higher CPI inﬂation. The inﬂow of aid-related FX results in a
nominal appreciation, which causes traded goods deﬂation
but more importantly triggers expenditure switching in the pri-
vate sector and therefore helps reduce aggregate demand pres-
sures somewhat. In the simulations, this deﬂation more than
oﬀsets the increase in non-traded goods inﬂation and, as a re-
sult, CPI inﬂation declines in the ﬁrst years. This and the neu-
tral policy stance by the central bank lead to a slight decrease
in nominal interest rates. Over time, as nominal rigidities dissi-
pate, the demand-driven boom fades away. However, since part
of the government spending has been used to increase public
investment, the public capital stock accumulates, causing a per-
sistent and positive eﬀect on GDP that accounts for most of the
output increase in the medium term. This process is reinforced
by higher private investment, which increases in response to the
positive eﬀect that higher public capital has on the marginal
product of private capital.
The central bank’s policy of no reserve accumulation allows
for a real exchange rate appreciation and leads to a full
absorption of aid by the private sector. That is, as the real ex-
change rate appreciates, imports (consumption and investment
of traded goods) increase and traded output declines (not
shown), resulting in a widening of the trade deﬁcit. This is
made possible by the central bank’s policy of selling all the for-
eign currency counterpart of aid to the private sector. In the
end, the increase of the trade deﬁcit is almost as big as the
aid surge.
We now compare these results with the case of a ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime (xs ¼ 5000), where the central bank does
not sterilize the excess of money liquidity induced by anyendogenous accumulation of reserves (see solid line with dots
in Figure 1). Absent sterilization, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
delivers similar real exchange rate appreciation dynamics to
those present under a ﬂexible regime. However, the mecha-
nism that drives this appreciation is diﬀerent. Under a ﬁxed ex-
change rate, traded goods prices remain constant, so non-
traded goods inﬂation has to increase signiﬁcantly more to
bring about the same relative price change. But this also means
substantially higher overall inﬂation, because unlike the ﬂexi-
ble regime case, there is no traded-good deﬂation. Higher non-
traded goods inﬂation is caused by larger demand pressures in
the non-traded sector (again, because of public consumption
of non-traded goods), as reﬂected by a more pronounced
short-run spike in GDP, relative to the one in the ﬂexible re-
gime scenario. Over the medium term, however, output re-
sponses are practically identical.
With a ﬁxed regime, the accumulation of international re-
serves is not a policy choice; instead, it is endogenously gov-
erned by the need to sell as much foreign exchange as
needed to achieve the rate of crawl. In contrast to the ﬂexible
exchange rate scenario, where all of the aid inﬂows are sold, a
small fraction of these inﬂows are accumulated as reserves.
Without sterilization, and provided the domestic currency
counterpart is fully spent by the government, the reserve accu-
mulation associated with the ﬁxed regime is associated with an
expansion of the money supply. 13 The real interest rate in-
creases to help keep inﬂation expectations anchored, but this
increase is moderate (relative to the ﬂexible regime) and
short-lived, despite the accommodative monetary policy
stance. Overall the money supply expansion is instrumental
in accommodating the increase in CPI inﬂation, which in turn
brings about the real appreciation necessary for close-to-full
private absorption of the aid inﬂows. In fact, under the ﬁxed
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sumption and private investment, as well as that of the trade
deﬁcit, are broadly the same as those under the ﬂexible regime.
(b) A ﬁxed exchange rate regime: sterilize versus do not sterilize
The results of Figure 1 reveal that, absent sterilization,
short-term inﬂation pressures may arise under a ﬁxed regime.
Authorities may ﬁnd this response problematic for two rea-
sons. First, central banks dislike inﬂation, especially when
such inﬂation reﬂects aggregate demand pressures. This is in-
deed the case under a peg and when there is no sterilization,
as can be seen in the temporary spike in GDP in the short
run. Second, the increase in inﬂation signals a sizeable real
appreciation, and could be interpreted as a loss of competitive-
ness. Central banks may worry about these developments,
especially since it could also be interpreted as a potential
threat of the sustainability of the exchange rate regime.
Since these inﬂationary pressures are associated with the
money supply expansion resulting from the foreign reserve
accumulation, the central bank may decide to prevent such
an expansion through open-market operations, i.e., sterilizing
the reserve accumulation. 14 We now proceed to analyze the
consequences of full sterilization, which are presented in
Figure 2.
Sterilization policies under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
can certainly reduce the inﬂationary pressures, but they may
also lead to signiﬁcant private-sector crowding out in the short
term and negative eﬀects on real output in the medium term
(see solid line with dots in Figure 2). With full sterilization,
the monetary policy stance becomes considerably tighter—to
keep (nominal) reserve money growing at the rate g—with realFigure 2. The macroeconomic implications of sterilization policies in a ﬁxed e
percentage deviations from steadyinterest rates increasing by more than before and remaining
high for a longer period than in the case of no sterilization.
This is eﬀective to contain the inﬂationary pressures in the
short term. Moreover the endogenous reserve accumulation
ends up being much larger, as agents no longer have the aid-
related liquidity to buy foreign currency as was the case be-
fore. The interest rates increase force private consumption
and private investment to decline in the short term. And the
associated reduction in private sector import demand limits
the economy-wide absorption as well as the real exchange rate
appreciation. As a result, the trade deﬁcit does not widen as
much as in the case of no sterilization. Furthermore, the
reduction in private investment (capital accumulation) has a
signiﬁcant adverse impact on real GDP in the medium term.
Hence, full sterilization policies under a ﬁxed regime come at
a signiﬁcant cost in terms of private sector spending and real
output.
(c) Fixed and managed ﬂoat regimes: the role of sterilization and
reserve accumulation
Figure 1 shows that, absent sterilization, the real macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of a ﬁxed regime are very similar to those of a
ﬂexible regime. But can the real macroeconomic eﬀects of a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime with full sterilization be replicated
with a ﬂexible regime? The answer depends on the role of re-
serve accumulation in the ﬂexible regime. In particular, one
can consider regimes where the accumulation of aid in reserves
is exogenously determined by the central bank making a ﬂex-
ible regime a managed ﬂoat. To capture a managed ﬂoat re-
gime, we can simulate the model under a ﬂexible regime
with no aid absorption—i.e., we set xs ¼ 0 and x ¼ 0 inxchange rate regime. Impulse responses are shown in annual terms and as
state, unless otherwise noted.
124 WORLD DEVELOPMENT(10) so all the aid surge is accumulated in reserves. From a pol-
icy perspective, the rationale of considering such an experi-
ment lies on the concerns that policy makers have about the
signiﬁcant real appreciation and loss of competitiveness asso-
ciated with a fully ﬂexible exchange rate regime (see Figure 1).
As a result, the central bank may decide to contain some of the
real appreciation by limiting the amount of foreign exchange
sales to the market and using the aid inﬂows instead to build
up foreign exchange reserves. 15
Figure 3 presents a comparison of the macroeconomic ef-
fects between a ﬁxed regime (xs ¼ 5000) and a managed ﬂoat
regime. In both cases we assume full sterilization, so (nominal)
reserve money keeps growing at the rate g. With the managed
ﬂoat regime, limiting the sale of aid-related foreign exchange
(accumulating international reserves) is indeed eﬀective in
reducing the appreciation, both in nominal and real terms.
As a result, the trade deﬁcit widens by much less than the in-
crease in aid, which implies no absorption of aid inﬂows. Gi-
ven the increase in government spending, partial absorption at
an economy-wide level must imply a reduction in private sec-
tor demand. This implies a signiﬁcant private sector consump-
tion and investment crowding out, which takes place in the
ﬁrst 3–5 years. Moreover, the reduction in private investment
has a signiﬁcant adverse impact on real GDP, roughly halving
the positive GDP eﬀect of scaled-up aid over the ﬁve-to-ten-
year horizon. Hence, in a managed ﬂoat, limiting foreign ex-
change sales may come at a signiﬁcant real cost.
Comparing these aid macroeconomic eﬀects of the managed
ﬂoat regime with those of a ﬁxed regime, under full steriliza-
tion, show important similarities particularly regarding the
crowding out of the private sector. The crux of the equivalence
lies on the following fact: whereas government spending of aid
normally corresponds to an externally-ﬁnanced increase inFigure 3. A comparison of the macroeconomic eﬀects of a ﬁxed exchange r
accumulation. Full sterilization is assumed in both cases. Impulse responses are s
otherwisespending, the central bank use of the foreign exchange coun-
terpart of aid to accumulate reserves or to maintain the ex-
change rate peg (combined with the sterilization policies)
transforms this into domestically-ﬁnanced spending. Exter-
nally- and domestically-ﬁnanced government spending have
very diﬀerent impacts on the private sector. In an externally-ﬁ-
nanced case, the foreign exchange inﬂows are used for ﬁnanc-
ing a larger current account and trade deﬁcits. This allows
government spending to increase without crowding out private
sector demand. In the case where the foreign counterpart of
aid inﬂows is accumulated in reserves—either as an exogenous
outcome as in the managed ﬂoat or an endogenous outcome as
in the ﬁxed regime—the trade deﬁcits do not increase as much
as in the case of no accumulation. Consequently, higher gov-
ernment spending necessitates a lower private sector demand
(crowding out), unless there is a very large supply response.
(d) A ﬁxed exchange rate regime: closed versus open capital
account
With a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the positive short-term
eﬀects of no sterilization on private consumption and invest-
ment depend on the degree of international capital mobility.
So far we have assumed that the capital account is fully closed
to private capital inﬂows (or outﬂows). But once the economy
becomes more integrated to international capital markets, a
policy of no sterilization under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
can also cause crowding out of the private sector, as shown
in Figure 4. 16With almost perfect international capital mobil-
ity, the domestic nominal interest rate is tied down by an
uncovered interest parity condition. While inﬂation increases
on impact, it is expected to decrease, thus resulting in an in-
crease in long-run real interest rates (not shown). This increaseate regime versus the eﬀects of a managed ﬂoat regime with full reserve
hown in annual terms and as percentage deviations from steady state, unless
noted.
Figure 4. The role of international capital mobility in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime without sterilization. Impulse responses are shown in annual terms and as
percentage deviations from steady state, unless otherwise noted.
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interest rates. As the spread widens, domestic agents tend to
demand more foreign bonds (accumulate net foreign assets)
and, in doing so, reduce private consumption and investment.
Hence, the private sector crowding out occurs in the short
term. And since private capital accumulation falls, medium-
term real output is not as high as in the case of limited inter-
national capital mobility.
On the other hand, and as is well known, with almost perfect
international capital mobility, full sterilization policies become
less eﬀective in controlling inﬂation under a ﬁxed regime. With
an open capital account, any attempt to raise interest rates as
part of the sterilization eﬀort would attract private sector cap-
ital inﬂows. This in turn would add to the foreign reserve build-
up and, therefore, to the sterilization need, thereby quickly
overwhelming the central bank’s ability to control the money
supply and inﬂation, while maintaining a ﬁxed exchange rate.
(e) Welfare
Our previous analysis has underscored the role of steriliza-
tion policies, in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and reserve accu-
mulation policies, in a managed (ﬂexible) regime, in shaping
the macroeconomic eﬀects of aid surges. There are interesting
trade-oﬀs. In a ﬁxed regime, full sterilization of the money
supply expansion, resulting from accumulation of interna-
tional reserves, can contain the associated inﬂationary pres-
sures but at the cost of crowding out the private sector,
including consumption. In a managed regime, full accumula-
tion in reserves of the aid surge (and full sterilization) can con-
tain real exchange rate appreciation pressures, but also at the
cost of aﬀecting negatively both private consumption and
investment.Our micro-founded model allows us to calculate the welfare
associated with these diﬀerent sterilization and reserve accu-
mulation policies and use it as a selection criterion. Following
Galı´ (2008), we deﬁne welfare in this economy as the present
value of a second-order approximation of the representative
household’s utility Ut around its steady state U , and express
it as a fraction of steady-state consumption c. 17 Hence wel-
fare corresponds to
X1
t¼0
bt
U t  U
Ucc
 
;
where Ut is instantaneous utility in (4) and Uc corresponds to
the marginal utility of consumption at the steady state.
To make the welfare analysis more exhaustive, we consider a
continuum of sterilization policies that correspond to a convex
combination of the two cases analyzed above—full steriliza-
tion and no sterilization. We can index these policies with
the sterilization parameter f 2 ½0; 1 to describe general open-
market operations as
bcbt 
bcbt1
npt
¼f mt1
npt
g1ð Þst Rt 
Rt1
np
  
þð1fÞ b
cb
t1
npt
g1ð Þ
 
:
Then when f ¼ 0, we recover (13), which corresponds to the
case of no sterilization. On the other hand, if f ¼ 1 we obtain
(12) reﬂecting full sterilization. Similarly, under a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, it is possible to calculate the welfare
associated with a continuum of reserve accumulation policies
xs 2 ½0; 1 with xs ¼ 0 (no reserve accumulation) and xs ¼ 1
(full accumulation), as the extreme cases.
The left-hand side of Figure 5 presents the results of this
welfare analysis for a ﬁxed regime for diﬀerent sterilization
Figure 5. Welfare analysis. Welfare corresponds to the present value of a second-order approximation of the representative household’s utility around its
steady state, expressing it as a fraction of steady-state consumption.
126 WORLD DEVELOPMENTpolicies. It shows that no sterilization appears to be a domi-
nant policy: for the given calibration, the welfare associated
with no sterilization (f ¼ 0) is much greater than that of full
sterilization (f ¼ 1). This is not surprising, since our previous
impulse response analysis revealed the signiﬁcant private con-
sumption crowding out under full sterilization. However, note
that although welfare is maximized in the absence of steriliza-
tion, there seems to be a threshold for the sterilization param-
eter (f 0:8) beyond which welfare signiﬁcantly declines. That
is, beyond that threshold, sterilization policies become eﬀec-
tive in controlling the growth rate of reserve money, but at
the cost of generating much higher real interest rates and,
therefore, signiﬁcant reductions in private consumption, espe-
cially in the ﬁrst years. Moreover, since households no longer
have the aid-related money liquidity to buy foreign currency,
the endogenous reserve accumulation ends up being much lar-
ger than for policies below that threshold. This further re-
stricts the consumption for traded goods and contributes to
the decline of aggregate consumption.
The right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the welfare analysis
for a ﬂexible regime for diﬀerent reserve accumulation policies,
which we refer to as a managed ﬂoat regime. 18 Welfare is
maximized under no reserve accumulation (x ¼ 1)—i.e., the
case of a fully ﬂexible exchange rate regime—which clearly
dominates the other policies, including full reserve accumula-
tion (x ¼ 0). As before, this is just a consequence of the fact
that not absorbing aid (accumulating reserves) may have a
negative eﬀect on private consumption, especially in the short
to medium run. In other words, with full absorption (no re-
serve accumulation), the positive impact of aid on consump-
tion is maximized.
The welfare analysis also conﬁrms the equivalence between a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime and a managed ﬂoat, along the
dimensions of sterilization and reserve accumulation policies.
As explained above, the equivalence should be clear in the ex-
treme cases of (i) full sterilization for a ﬁxed and (ii) full re-
serve accumulation and sterilization for a ﬂoat. In other
words, a managed ﬂoat regime should behave as a ﬁxed re-
gime, insofar as in these cases both regimes involve accumulat-
ing reserves and full sterilization. The main diﬀerence is that in
our model the managed ﬂoat regime involves accumulating aidin reserves as an exogenous policy by the central bank, while in
the ﬁxed regime it is an endogenous decision driven by a nom-
inal exchange rate target. Perhaps more surprising is the equiv-
alence between the fully ﬂexible regime and the ﬁxed regime
with no sterilization. The real macroeconomic eﬀects are very
similar, which explains the equivalence of the welfare results,
but the transmission mechanism is diﬀerent. In the ﬂexible re-
gime, the real appreciation associated with aid is driven by the
nominal exchange rate appreciation, while in the ﬁxed regime,
it is caused by inﬂation.
(f) Discussion
The previous results have yielded a number of insights that
merit further discussion. The ﬁrst insight, which is known in
academic circles but is sometimes overlooked in the policy de-
bate is that, under a peg, movements in inﬂation become an
essential component of macroeconomic adjustment. In the
case of an aid surge, allowing the aid to ﬁnance much needed
imports (including to help implement welcome increases in pri-
vate investment) requires an equilibrium real appreciation,
and inﬂation is the ﬂip side of such an outcome. In addition,
in the presence of nominal rigidities, the increase in inﬂation
is distortionary because it must be accompanied by an artiﬁ-
cial expansion of the economy which would not have taken
place if prices were fully ﬂexible. This adds to the drama of
the aid surge, because it would indicate that the economy is
overheating, and that something must be done about it, while
the opposite is true. More generally, the “real” nature of inﬂa-
tionary movements can be diﬃcult to acknowledge by the cen-
tral bank, because it runs counter to the consensus view on the
role of such institutions in modern economies, which is to en-
sure stable inﬂation and keep aggregate demand pressures in
check. Understanding the nature of inﬂation in these regimes
is therefore essential to allow the aid to fulﬁll its role.
The second insight is that important challenges emerge when
the central bank, out of concern for inﬂationary pressures or
the potential loss of competitiveness, sterilizes any endogenous
accumulation of reserves, in a ﬁxed regime, or any exogenous
accumulation of reserves, in a ﬂexible (managed) regime.
While it succeeds in curbing inﬂation or containing real appre-
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vate investment and private consumption. With a ﬁxed regime,
these large real eﬀects may arise in part from the inability to
recognize the increase in inﬂation for what it is. More gener-
ally they reﬂect the fact that by curbing the inﬂationary pres-
sure, the central bank is eﬀectively undoing the aid surge to the
point where the aid ends parked in an account in New York or
London (as part of the central bank’s reserve holdings) rather
than ﬁnancing much needed local projects. In this case the ﬁs-
cal expansion that follows the increase in aid is domestically as
opposed to externally ﬁnanced. This insight underscores the
crucial importance of the central bank in eﬀectively determin-
ing the impact of the aid surge.
A third and related insight is that sterilization policies in
pegs have real eﬀects that go beyond the presence of nominal
rigidities. Because these policies can inﬂuence the actual accu-
mulation of reserves, they aﬀect real outcomes over the med-
ium term, ranging from movements in private consumption
and investment to movements in the real exchange rate. Just
like for the case of movements in inﬂation, the real nature of
sterilization in pegs is fundamentally diﬀerent from the view
of open-market operations in closed economies or open econ-
omies with ﬂexible exchange rates. The latter have a real eﬀect
only to the extent that nominal rigidities are present, which
implies that the eﬀects of monetary policy die out after a few
quarters. 19 Whenever possible, we have stressed the term
“central bank policy” as opposed to “monetary policy” to
emphasize the real nature of these decisions. In our view, this
“realness” adds some nuance to the concept of central bank
independence, because in this particular case such indepen-
dence can result in suboptimal policies.
We now discuss some important caveats. In our model sim-
ulations, it was preferable to fully absorb the aid. But there are
cases where some accumulation of aid in reserves may be
desirable. With managed ﬂoats, Berg, Gottschalk, et al.
(2010) show that under pessimistic assumptions—i.e., aid is
fully spent but the government public investment is very inef-
ﬁcient and the existence of large learning-by-doing externali-
ties in the traded sector capturing Dutch disease eﬀects—
accumulating some of the aid in reserves may be welfare
enhancing. 20 Simulations under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
but with the same pessimistic assumptions yield the same re-sults about the desirability of reserve accumulation (not
shown). A second caveat is that in our model we abstract from
other policy instruments—e.g., direct price controls or export
subsidies—that may also help oﬀset inﬂation and real appreci-
ation pressures, beyond sterilization and reserve accumulation
policies. Furthermore from the government and central bank
perspective, there are other important considerations when
deciding for fully sterilizing aid surges, such as the desirability
of facing dramatically higher interest rates in thin money mar-
kets while dealing with large stock of short-term domestic
debt. 21 Finally, our welfare analysis has not considered the
implications of macroeconomic volatility which may aﬀect
the comparison and equivalences between ﬁxed and ﬂexible
exchange rate regimes.5. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how, under limited capital mobility, the
combination of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes with steriliza-
tion and reserve accumulation policies by the central bank,
in response to an aid surge, actually shapes the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of aid in a fundamental way. We have discussed
the trade-oﬀs and welfare consequences of these policies high-
lighting some similarities, in terms of real macroconomic ef-
fects, between ﬁxed exchange rate regimes and ﬂexible
regimes (managed ﬂoats).
Results from the paper raise various questions that have not
been covered here. The importance of equilibrium movements
in inﬂation suggests that the optimal design of policy, in coun-
tries that have ﬁxed exchange rate regimes but limited capital
mobility (and thus some degree of monetary policy auton-
omy), may lead to a radical departure from the consensus view
on optimal monetary policy that is found in the traditional
new-Keynesian literature. 22 This is because the objective of
stabilizing aggregate demand needs to be measured against
the need for equilibrium movements in the real exchange rate.
Second, downward nominal rigidities, e.g., in wages, may
qualify some of our ﬁndings about the desirability of sizeable
but temporary real appreciations, because such appreciations
could end up threatening the sustainability of the peg. We
leave these questions for future work.NOTES1. On the more pessimistic view, see Rajan and Subramanian (2011),
among many others. On the belief that aid may spur growth by ﬁnancing
much-needed public infrastructure, see Collier (2006).
2. Notable exceptions include works by Buﬃe, Adam, O’Connell, and
Pattillo (2008) and Adam, O’Connell, Buﬃe, and Pattillo (2009).
3. The modern literature on the transfer problem started with the famous
Keynes–Ohlin (1929) controversy.
4. The distinction between spending and absorption of aid has been used
for policy analysis in a number of IMF and non-IMF policy papers, see
Berg et al. (2012). Buﬃe, O’Connell, and Adam (2010) criticize some of
these analyses.
5. They also found that not absorbing the aid (accumulating reserves)
could be welfare-improving if, as is sometimes feared, public investment is
highly ineﬃcient and export externalities are large. However, in this worst-
case scenario an even better solution is to not spend the aid at all,
underscoring the importance of ﬁscal/central bank coordination.6. Intriguingly, there is some evidence that private capital outﬂows
tended to coincide with the aid surges studied in Berg et al. (2007).
Aiyar and Ruthbah. (2008) ﬁnd some systematic evidence to the same
eﬀect.
7. For a detailed description of the model used in this paper, ﬁrst-order
conditions and deﬁnition of the equilibrium see the unpublished Appendix
in the IMF Working Paper No. 14/18 available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/CV/AuthorCV.aspx?AuthID=236.
8. We assume investment in both the traded and non-traded sectors has
the same composite structure and same shares as aggregate consumption.
9. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for alternative methods to ensure
stationarity of net foreign assets.
10. Berg, Mirzoev, et al. (2010), Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010) allow the
government to adjust the rate at which it spends the aid, by introducing
government deposits at the central bank dgt as an additional variable. They
study the rate of spending as an additional policy decision. As our
128 WORLD DEVELOPMENTemphasis is on central bank policy, we simplify the model and focus on the
case where aid is spent as it accrues.
11. To be precise, our ﬁxed exchange rate regime is a crawling peg unless
pS ¼ 1.
12. model was simulated with the software Dynare. See http://
www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare.
13. This follows from the central bank’s balance sheet in Eqn. (9), where
the reserve buildup increases the second term on the right hand side,
whereas no sterilization and full government spending keep the ﬁrst
termconstant.
14. An important caveat is that sterilization is feasible only with a
suﬃciently closed capital account, as is the case with the Uganda
calibration used here.
15. Berg et al. (2007) ﬁnd that this is exactly what many sub-Saharan
central banks with ﬂexible exchange rate regimes did during aid surges.
16. To open the capital account we set the portfolio adjustment costs
parameter t equal to 0:001.
17. Note that since our model is non-stochastic, the spirit of our analysis
diﬀers from that of the recent optimal policy analysis of the
new-Keynesian literature. This literature studies optimal ﬁscal andmonetary policies in the context of stochastic models in which the
volatility of the shocks plays a crucial role (see for instance (Schmitt-
Grohe´ & Uribe, 2007) among others). Here we abtract from these issues
that are investigated in a similar setup in Moldovan, Yang, and Zanna
(2014).
18. Note that here we assume full sterilization.19. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999, 2005) for empirical
evidence on, and theoretical foundations of, these assertions.
20. Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010) show that much of the challenge
comes from trying to spend the aid in the ﬁrst place. In this case it is
better to limit the amount of spending so that government savings
coincide with the accumulation of reserves. This avoids having to
crowd out the private sector in order to limit the negative eﬀect on
productivity.
21. Our model generates a signiﬁcant increase in real interest rates under
full sterilization. However, the increase in real interest rates would be even
more dramatic if the model included hand-to-mouth consumers, which
lower the aggregate interest-elasticity of the demand for bonds and can
help mimic market thinness. This type of consumer is analyzed in Berg,
Mirzoev, et al. (2010), and Berg, Gottschalk, et al. (2010) and we do not
include them in this model for simplicity.
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